• Global North has 23% of the world’s population, and 85% of the world’s income, while Global South has 77% of the world’s population, and 15% of the world’s income.
• The world's poorest 50 countries are home to 20 per cent of the world's population, yet they account for less than 2 per cent of the world's income.
• The 20 per cent of the world's population at the top of the income ladder receives 83 per cent of global income.
• The 20 per cent of the world's population at the bottom of the income ladder receives only 1.5 per cent of global income.
• In 1994, transnational corporations racked up sales of over $4.8 trillion, a volume larger than all of world trade put together.
• The United States remains the world's "powerhouse of wealth", according to Forbes Magazine, which reported that, in 1994, 129 of the world's 388 billionaires lived there, the richest individual having a net worth of $13.4 billion. [UN, 1996]

Bibliography:

1. Rand, Ayn. Capitalism. 2003. Accessed 02 November 2004
2. Theotonio Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence," in K.T. Fann and Donald C. Hodges, eds., Readings in U.S. Imperialism. Boston: Porter Sargent, 1971, p.226.
3. "Annan Blames South Marginalization on Globalization" People, 13 April 2000. Accessed 06 November 2004
4. "G-77 Chairman Warns of Widening Gap Between Rich and Poor Nations" Journal of Group 77 16/2 (2003). Accessed 02 November 2004
5. UN. 1996. United Nations Development Program. Accessed 03 November 2004.

What have been the reasons that have led to the recent popularity of the MMA that has translated in their success in the elections? My main contention in this paper is that it has really not been the MMA’s ability to connect with the masses but rather the failure of the secular mainstream parties to do so which has been the deciding factor.

’Ideology refers to a set of ideas and beliefs which makes clear what is valued and what is not, what must be maintained and what must be changed, and what shapes the attitudes of those that share it’[Jackson & Jackson]

The defining characteristic of a political party has much to do with its ideology which puts it closer to the voters who share a similar vision of progress, change and ideological position. The much needed ideology which is so pivotal to politics and a political party was missing within the wings of both secular parties.

’In the 2002 elections, they failed to take a stand on issues like Musharraf’s controversial referendum, US attack on Afghanistan, Legal Framework Order (LFO), restoration of democracy and one-man-one-post policy. Such lack of character undermined their credentials and strengthened the locus standi of the mullahs’ [Misra, 2005].

Another important factor in party politics and one that promotes progressive change is the role of internal elections within political parties. This is necessary in training of new leadership within the party ranks and ensures that a political vacuum isn’t created if the old leadership gets eliminated.

’In the case of Pakistan, of the major parties in the country, only the right wing, fundamentalist Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) has been able to conduct regular, internal elections. Within most of the other political parties, leadership has remained limited to a particular group, sometimes based on kinship networks, articulating only a narrow range of interests. Internal power struggles in the absence of party elections have led frequently to the fragmentation of political parties into factions or splinter groups, and this process has contributed in part to the steadily increasing number of political groupings present in the country.’[Human Rights Commission Of Pakistan - Electoral Watch]

This has resulted in the failing of the secular parties to effectively train its leadership to changing trends and demands within the political scenario. Furthermore, since the top heads of the two parties (PPP and PML) have never changed this has effectively led to the deceleration of the growth of democracy within the country since political parties have been unable to include more people within the political culture.

The main characteristics and functions of ’strong’ political parties (the features which ’weak’ undemocratic, elite-based political parties lack), are described by David Apter - that first of all, they organize as well as transmit public opinion and attitudes to the government; they take into account the entire socio-political framework of the society in which they function and draw their support from. Thus, political parties not only perform an important role in linking the needs and demands of the people to the policy making people within the state, they also need to provide transparency and accountability in a way that they have to maintain a respectable record of citizen responsiveness in order to get re-elected for another tenure. [Udofio, pg 436]. Responding to a question as to the reasons for MMA’s success, Pervez Hoodbhoy responded:

’The manifestos of the secular parties stopped at shallow rhetoric that nobody really believed. These parties said little that made any sense about how to approach Pakistan’s gigantic problems - the constant threat of war with India, a parasitic military establishment that has emaciated the country, growing poverty and mal-distribution of wealth, an education system that collapsed long ago, shrinking water supplies, environmental degradation and much more’ [Newsline,2005].

Failure for the political parties has not only been in their inability to meet the needs of the masses but also their involvement in misappropriation of resources and moral turpitude. Over the years, the disenchantment of the public with political parties, especially with PPPP and PML-N, increased because of widespread corruption, embezzlement, nepotism, and mis-governance [Misra, 2005].

The concept of the role political parties not only in government but also out of government as opposition parties to keep a check on the parties in power by educating and transmitting public opinion and acting like a ’loyal opposition’ [Harrison, pg 392, Udofio, pg 442, Jackson & Jackson] has failed to materialize in Pakistan and successive governments in power have had charges of corruption leveled against them by the same ’worthy opposition’. In 1990 and 1996, corruption and mismanagement were cited among the reasons for the Benazir government’s removal. This politics of ’mud slinging’ has only helped destabilize governments in power and brought opposition into the governments.

However, blaming just the mainstream parties of under-performance is missing a certain essence since Pakistan’s political failures cannot be understood fully without acknowledging the role of the establishment in preventing the emergence of genuinely popular and well-organized political parties [SA Tribune, 2005]. Thus a pertinent question which I shall address now is as to what role if any did the military establishment play in influencing the outcome of the October elections, and if it did, what was it to gain?

It would be naive to suggest that Pakistan which has had its share of both military as well as civilian governments with the former dominating the political scenario (for 31 years) [11, NLR], has had a change of heart and is really oriented towards democratic change. Akbar Zaidi contends that the elections of 2002 have been a sort of order continuing in the country where the supremacy of the army has always been dominant over the civilian public [Zaidi, 175].

The controversy all began when the military government in order to support a civilian facade decided of re-creating a political party which would be ’pro-Musharraf’.

’Like an out-of-work courtesan, the Muslim League - the country’s foundational party - was given a shower, dusted with powder and provided with a new wig, before being displayed to the growing queue of potential suitors’[Ali]

Thus from the defected ranks of the People’s Party and the Muslim League, the PML (QA) was born. This sadly also represents the degree of opportunism within the mainstream political parties of supporting the ousting of the elected incumbent government so that they can have a chance to form their own government. However ’Lota-ism’ is not a new phenomenon.

The government after creating a ’King’s Party’ further announced the requirement of a Bachelor’s degree as a pre-requisite, creating yet another hurdle barring nearly 95-96% of the MNAs and MPAs from contesting elections. Even the Supreme Court upheld the decision siding with the establishment, showing its institutional integrity.

The voting process itself was rigged as the establishment tried to tamper with ’democratic forces’ to steer election to their choice of candidate. The EU evaluation committee (ECP) found misuse of state resources in favor of political parties, in particular, but not exclusively, for the PML (QA). The government’s late lift on the ban on political parties’ activities a few days before polling day, and the debarring of major political parties’ heads from contesting elections, resulted in delays which effectively reduced the campaign period to a mere twenty-three days. Public authorities and also the local administration (Nazims) up to senior levels of governance were actively involved in partisan electioneering which appeared to be a pattern throughout the country. On a number of occasions, state officials and Nazims made public statements in support of certain candidates or against other candidates.[Europa, 2005] However the PML (QA) still couldn’t gain a majority and hence had to form coalition with other political parties. The MMA emerged as a winner in NWFP and forged an alliance in Baluchistan. [Misra, 2005]

Although most governments that came into power remained covertly secular, time and again the religious nature of the state had to be re-affirmed and those that remained in power tried to expand on their Islamic credentials as a means to acquire legitimacy. We see this throughout history with Bhutto’s declaration of Ahmedis as non-Muslims, Zia’s Islamization in the 80’s and the Shariat Bill by Nawaz Sharif. [Gaborieau, pg 44-46] However surprisingly, Musharraf portrayed himself as a moderate and secular Muslim and vowed to rid Pakistan of extremist elements [Asdar Ali]. This may in fact have been attributable to the increased pressure that Pakistan has had from the US to crack down on terrorist and jehadist camps and reform of madarassas [Misra, 2005]. So in lieu of the changed objectives of the US as a ’benevolent leader’ [Akhtar, pg 5] Musharraf is now promoting the secular ideology.

With the victory of the MMA, an alliance of ’Islamic hardliners’ as viewed by the US, is wary of the consequences if power was ever to fall into the hands of these Islamists. Zaidi is of the view that Musharraf stands to benefit from this victory of the MMA, as he will be in a better position to negotiate with the US. He will be able to use this as a way of legitimizing and furthering his own rule by arguing that Pakistan will be in dangerous hands if left up to these ’fundamental’ groups. [ibid, 5] Ahmed Rashid, an eminent Pakistani journalist while writing for the Wall Street Journal commented that it appeared that the army and the ISI sponsored the religious leaders, or Mullahs, to ensure that the West does not question the need for continued military rule to contain the religious parties. [Daily Excelsior, 2005] With the changed perception of the West particularly the US after 9/11, it has sought to curb the growth of ’Islamic militancy’ in order to create a world based on ’peace’. Given the old role of ’Pakistan as a safe haven for terrorists’ and with a religious party in power, the Bush-Mush alliance was easily mandated within the Senate. This indicates that the elections might have been engineered to actually ’let the MMA win’ since Musharraf had much to gain from this outcome.

The MMA’s performance post election period has cast further doubts amongst the opposition and other observers. Initially the criticism that MMA members made of the military regime and the stand on the Legal Framework Order (LFO) made many believe that the MMA’s success lies in its willingness to challenge the military and the US. But recent developments whereby it is quite clear that the MMA is going to make a deal with the government on LFO prove that the MMA was never truly against the military intervention. It was just waiting to be offered the right incentives to join the ruling coalition. If the religious parties that together form the MMA had actually started believing in democracy against military rule then they could not have contemplated a settlement over LFO. This is the case right now and will remain so till General Musharraf is in power. All the criticism that MMA leaders made of military government in the past year becomes meaningless now; they will just become another PML(Q), a party which works to strengthen military in the country’s politics [Jang Group, 2005]. Furthermore, the recent developments mark that the Parliament has accepted to keep Musharraf in power. This only goes on to further the fact that there has effectively been an MMA alliance -- not Muttahida Majlis-e-Ammal, but rather a Mullah-Military-Alliance in which the religious parties have been co-opted, thus marring the politics of the country. Furthermore, the Supreme Court (SC) has given the military president a free hand to thwart the constitution and change it as he wishes. This speaks of the sad state of affairs in Pakistan.

Recommendations:

Some of the outcomes that have emerged from this paper are weak political parties, an authoritarian military establishment which seeks to entrench itself playing upon the opportunist elements in society and weak institutions. Because political parties were ’weak’ in the sense that they exerted no real mass popular support of the masses, they served only their own vested interests, and failed to keep themselves accountable to the public, which gave the military the power to intervene as a savior of the nation. Every time this has happened, the military has grown stronger and with the situation prevailing right now it is very evident that the military has, and will, go to large extents to retain its power and longevity within the Pakistani state. However the military is not the answer or a viable alternative to weak political parties and systems because as seen throughout history, the military in Pakistan has stunted the emergence of democratic political processes and parties in order to make its role in politics self-sustaining.

The problems of education, health, poverty, and injustice that affect the Pakistani public are rooted in the bigger governance problems. The military has used different tactics to legitimize itself and has been welcomed by the bureaucracy and self serving politicians.

The civil-military elite is the pre-eminent capital-owning class and has due to its advantageous position (both in terms of power and money), penetrated most of the institutions in Pakistan. It has used this position to its advantage, to further its interests, which have been detrimental to the country. As long as the military keeps intervening and controlling the state institutions, public institutions like the parliament and the judiciary will never develop. Without developing and strengthening these institutions it is very difficult to develop a just and equitable society

Bibliography

• Akhtar, Asim Sajjad, ’The classic frontline state’ in Mohmand, Shandana, K(ed.) Development in Pakistan, Lahore.
• Ali, Tariq, ’The Color Khaki’ 8 Feb. 2004.
• Asdar Ali, Kamran, ’Islam, Politics and Change’ in Mohmand, Shandana, K(ed.) Development in Pakistan, Lahore, p.1.
• Daily Excelsior, ’Rise of MMA to Power’’, Khan, Abdul Wadood Khan.
• Europa, ’European Union’s Election Observation Mission to Pakistan 2002’, 10 Feb 2005.
• Gaborieau, Marc, ’Religion in the Pakistani Polity’ in Mohmand, Shandana, K. (ed.), Development in Pakistan, Lahore, pp. 44-46.
• Harrison, Paul, 1993, ’Chapter 20: Something is Rotten in the State - the Politics of Poverty’, Inside the Third World, p. 392.
• Human Rights Commission of Pakistan -Electoral Watch, Political Parties in Pakistan, Feb 2005.
• Jackson & Jackson, ’Modern Ideologies and Philosophies’ in Rais, Rasul Baksh (ed.) Introduction to Politics p. 151.
• Jackson & Jackson, ’Political Parties and Interests Groups’ in Rais, Rasul Baksh (ed.) Introduction to Politics.
• Jang Group, ’MMA and LFO ’, Bano Masooda.
• Misra, Ashutosh, ’Rise of Religious Parties in Pakistan: Causes and Prospects’, 1 Feb 2005.
• Newsline, ’When The Mullahs Come Marching In’, Shimaila Matri, 6 Feb 2005.
• South Asian Tribune, ’How the Army Subverted Pakistan’s Political System, Again and Again’, 2 Feb 2005.
• Udofio, O. E, 1981, Nigerian Political Parties: Their Role in Modernizing the Political System, 1920 -1966, Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 11 No. 4, p.435.
• Zaidi, Akbar, S., ’Continuity Rather than Change: Elections 2002’ in Mohmand, Shandana, K. (ed.), Development in Pakistan, Lahore, pp 175-179.

The history between Musharraf and Sharif begins to unfold in the aftermath of dismissal of General Jehangir Karamat, who was chief of army staff at that time. Musharraf was superseded above many senior generals, so that Sharif could manipulate him more easily, and made the army chief. Army was unhappy at the removal of General Karamat and at the attempts of Sharif to gain full control of the country through Shariah Law. This was considered as an attempt to nullify military establishment and bureaucracy. The turning point occurred in May 1999 when Pakistan army and Kashmiri militants sought control of the Kargil area in Kashmir supposedly on Musharraf’s orders. Pakistan gained tactical advantage and Indian Army was suffering heavy casualties there. What was more alarming for Indian PM, Atal Bihari Vajpai, was the fact that it all came after his visit to Lahore, when both countries were trying to solve their half a century old issues.

By late May and early June 1999, a serious military conflict was underway along a hundred and fifty kilometers border in the Kargil area. Pakistan denied its involvement; a claim which was not taken seriously anywhere around the world. The whole situation was further clouded for the outside observers because it was unclear that who was calling the shots in Islamabad. Sharif seemed to be genuinely interested in the peace process that had started in February 1999, while General Musharraf remained in a different mold. He was said to be a hardliner who had wanted to settle the score with India once and for all.

Given the nuclear capabilities of both South Asian neighbors, United States was forced to intervene. At first United States undersecretary Thomas Pickering informed both sides about its concerns in late may. Then US secretary of state, Madeline Albright, called Sharif, while General Tony Zinni called Musharraf, asking them both to withdraw Pakistani backed forces from Kargil. That message did not work. So, United States went public condemning the Pakistani initiative in the disputed territory and asked Pakistan to pull its troops back. The American stand made Sharif realize the fact that Pakistan was left isolated at the international forum and even evergreen partner China asked both sides to exercise restraint. By the end of June, Sharif had started to seek for American help to solve the problem. (Riedel, 2002)

On the 2nd of July, Sharif called President Bill Clinton asking him if he could visit Washington. President Clinton told him in clear terms he will only help in facing Pakistan’s face in international community if Pakistan was ready to withdraw its troops from Kargil. At that time Sharif seemed desperate to stay in power and it was obvious that his military was not backing him and was even trying to get him out of power. On 4th of July, Sharif finally arrived in Washington. He brought his whole family with him fearing that he might not be able to go back to Pakistan if he withdrew the forces. He told Washington that his military was asking him to take a tougher stand on Kashmir issue while he personally felt obliged to Lahore peace process. Washington was already annoyed at Sharif for carrying out the Nuclear Tests in May 1998 despite the offers of economic and military aid. US-Pakistan relationship was not helped by Pakistan’s involvement in Kargil either. Clinton told Sharif that once Kargil was over, India would have more credibility with US than Pakistan. Sharif was disappointed at American response and asked Clinton to help him stay in power and save Pakistan’s face. On 4th of July a joint statement was issued where Sharif announced troops’ withdrawal from Kargil to the displeasure of military back home.

The situation further deteriorated in Pakistan’s political arena. US knew that strings were being pulled by Army headquarters in Rawalpindi rather than Islamabad. Army was not at all happy at Sharif’s decision to withdraw the forces rendering the military a loser in the whole power game. Series of events, from General Karamat’s sacking to Sharif’s Shariah Law to Kargil withdrawal, had lead the army to believe that Sharif was trying to offset Army’s influence in country’s affairs. Army had started to plan a coup. At the army’s headquarters in Rawalpindi, it had been decided that if Sharif took another step against the Army’s will, he will be overthrown.

Sharif was aware of the whole scenario and knew where to look for help. In September 1999, he sent his brother Shahbaz to Washington to inform them that all was not well in Islamabad. According to Bruce Riedel, special adviser to the President of United States, Shahbaz was interested in making Washington realize that his brother needed Washington’s help to stay in power. (Riedel, 2002) He told Clinton that a military coup was inevitable, but Washington denied any such intelligence information. Clinton told him that Washington won’t interfere in the internal affairs of any other country, a claim that could be found false in many other examples.

The final nail in Sharif’s coffin arrived on the evening of 12th October, 1999, when Musharraf was aboard a plane on his way back from Sri Lanka, he provoked the army to rebel by sacking him. Sharif made the grave mistake of not taking the army in confidence before committing such attempt. Musharraf’s plane was bound for Karachi when Sharif sacked him. Karachi airports’ runway lights had been turned off and the runway was blocked by fire vehicles. Musharraf was called to the cockpit of the plane and was told about the whole situation. He was told that his plane won’t be allowed to land anywhere in Pakistan jeopardizing the lives of hundreds of people in that plane. The pilot told him that the plane did not have much fuel to continue to Dubai and Musharraf won’t agree to land in India. (Jones, 2002)

He asked the pilot to inform the authorities about the situation and how it could end hundreds of innocent lives. Sharif was made aware of this fact, and he asked General Ziauddin, the newly appointed army chief, to take over the Nawabshah airport, in northern Sindh, and ordered the plane to be refueled and forced to leave. By this time Army had become aware of the ground realities and took charge of the things. They took over Sharif’s residence and put him under house arrest. The newly appointed army chief was with Sharif and he was taken into custody as well. The next step that army took was to take over Karachi Airport and inform the pilot to come back to Karachi. Musharraf was made aware of the ground situation, but he was not ready to believe it. He considered it as a plan to capture him. He ordered the plane to stay in air despite the fact that fuel was going down. It was not until he had talked to a close friend who was a general in Army that he decided to land in Karachi. (Jones, 2002)

The aftermath of the whole 12th October scenario came in the shape of the military coup.
The list of reasons may go on and on but the fact remains that the incidents that lead to 12th October, include the running over of Supreme Court by Sharif’s supporters, removal of General Jehangir Karamat, the nuclear tests of May 1998, Shariah law and Kargil war. Sharif stood alone amidst the Military, United States and Pakistani public. United States did not help him because they were annoyed at him for nuclear tests and Kargil war. Military never came to terms with him and Pakistanis in general didn’t like him for his government’s socio-economic policies. The lessons to be learnt here are that no matter how much you advocate democracy, the reality is much different. In a country like Pakistan, where history is marred with dictatorships after every decade democracy can’t work. People might say that United States doesn’t play an active role in Pakistan’s foreign policy anymore, but even the most recent and significant event in our history shows that no matter how much we deny it, we are still a victim of colonialism or neo-colonialism or whatever name you might like to give. Maybe someday we’ll be able to stand up on our feet and take our decisions on our own. Till then our prime ministers and presidents will keep on flying to Washington and obey the orders of their capitalist masters.

The Islamic World Front issued a fatwa on 23 February 1998, charging the United States with the occupation of the holiest lands of Islam, with infliction of "great devastation" on the Iraqi people as consequence of the first Gulf War and with servitude to the "Jew's petty state". Further, it declared that "all these crimes and sins committed by the Americans are a clear declaration of war on Allah, his messenger, and Muslims". Thus the Islamic World Front called upon the Muslims to engage in a holy war against the West.

In the Western world, Islamic fundamentalism is seen as a threat to the regional Middle Eastern interests and to broader Western interests in the Muslim world. The Iranian Revolution, the attacks on Western embassies in Africa, various hijacking and hostage taking incidents and the violence propagated by groups like the Army of God (Jund Allah), the Holy War (al-Jihad) and the party of God (Hizbullah), all signal the emergence of militant Jihad targeted against the West (Esposito, 1999). Esposito argues that at times it seems that the Communist threat to the West is being transferred to a new threat i.e. the thread of Islamic fundamentalism, where the main tool employed is 'jihad against the West'.

Jihad is an Arabic word, which can mean to "to strive", "to exert" or "to fight", and therefore it can be used to mean different things in different contexts. Esposito defines Jihad as a "struggle against one's evil inclinations, (or) an exertion to convert unbelievers, or a struggle for the moral betterment of the Islamic community."(Esposito, 2003)

This paper studies the relevance of the concept of Jihad in contemporary times. It presents the Islamic and Western discourses on the concept of Jihad and then provides an analysis of the relevance of the concept of Jihad to cotemporary times.

The Islamic discourse on Jihad can be divided into two main categories: the modernist perspective and the fundamentalist perspective.

Presenting the modernist perspective, Moulavi Chiragh Ali contradicts the prevalent belief amongst Muslim and non-Muslim thinkers that "religious war of aggression is one of the tenants of Islam, and (is) prescribed by the Quran for the purpose of proselytizing or exacting tribute." On the contrary, Ali believes that Jihad was not ordained to be an offensive and proselytizing war against Darul-Harb, declaring that "all the fighting injunctions in the Quran are, in the first place only in self-defense, and none of them has any reference to make warfare [sic] offensively. In the second place, it is to be particularly noted that they were transitory in their nature, and are not to be considered positive injunctions for future observance." The crux of Ali's argument lies in the belief that Islam is not aggressive religion. He argues that although the Prophet was persecuted throughout his lifetime, but never initiated a war of aggression against Darul-Harb. The mission of the Holy Prophet's life was not to wage war, as he was only ordained to enlighten the world to the message of Islam. History is witness to the various pacts of peace and compromise that were reached between the various Arab tribes and the Prophet. War was only launched in response to a breach of a treaty, as was the case with the famous Treaty of Hudaibia. Ali also contends that the verses of the Quran that are usually presented in support of Jihad as an aggressive war are misquoted and misinterpreted. In particular, he argues that they have to be read as a whole and in context of the times of the Prophet. He also believes that the rules of interpretation are violated by selectively reading the injunctions of the Quran to support a certain point of view. He point to an established rule while interpreting the Quran, that if there are two injunctions on the same issue, one conditional and the other general, then the conditional one is given precedence. Citing these aberrations, Ali argues that the injunctions relating to an aggressive war against Darul-Harb have been misinterpreted and read out of context. In support of his arguments he says that respected legists of first and second century Hegeria, like Ibn (son of) Omar the second Khalif, Sofian Souri, Ibn Shorormath, Ata and Amar-bin-Dinar held the belief "that fighting was not religiously incumbent (wajib), was only a voluntary act, and that only those were to be fought against who attacked the Moslems" (Ali).

The contemporary proponents of the fundamentalist interpretation of Jihad are Syed Qutb, Maulana Maududi and Majid Khadduri. The fundamentalist interpretation is heavily dependent on the belief that the real objective of Islam is to establish the sovereignty of God over the world. Maududi says Islam wants to remove man from the subjugation of man-made ideologies and make him subservient to God alone. He believes that man-made ideologies and systems cannot provide justice and equality in the world, as man-made ideologies promote the "the lordship of man over man". Thus, the establishment of the ideal society is every Muslim's duty and to "stake one's life and everything else to achieve this purpose is called Jihad" (Maududi). Furthermore, man is under obligation to spread the word of God far and wide and thus Jihad is also sanctioned "against polytheism and must be suffered by all non-Muslims who reject Islam, or, in the case of the dhimmis (Scripturaries) refuse to pay the poll tax" (Khadduri, 59). Therefore through Jihad, the Muslims are required to incorporate Darul-Harb into Darul-Islam.

The establishment of this political authority is the collective duty of a community and has not been ordained to individuals alone. Khadduri agues that Islam has imposed this obligation on the community to centralize the command and decision making structure, implying only the Muslim head of state can declare a 'jihad' in the name of Islam. Maududi lays out further criteria, arguing those fighting in the name of Islam, should not harbour any personal agendas and should only fight for "Allah's pleasure and for the benefit and well-being of His creation."

While Khadduri and Maududi focus on the philosophical underpinnings of Jihad, it is Syyid Qutb's discourse on Jihad that provides direction to the Islamists organisations of the day. Qutb slams modernist interpretations of Jihad as mere apologies provided under the influence of Western masters. He categorically states that Jihad was not ordained by God to be a defensive war and agrees that the goal of the Muslim Ummah is the "establishment of God's domain in the world, the elimination of human kingship, (and) the revision of authority from the hands of the usurpers toward God." In pursuit of this goal, he lays out three distinct phases. In the first phase, the Prophet was ordered to preach peacefully and take "recourse to forgiveness" to those who accept God's message. In the second phase he was ordered to fight those who came to fight him, but to "restrain himself from those who did not make war with him." In the last phase he was ordered to fight the polytheists, which has to be continued by the followers of the Prophet.

The establishment of "God's domain in the world" can be done both by peaceful and non-peaceful means. But, Qutb believes that while peaceful means are recommended, they will not suffice as man lusts for power and will not willingly abdicate power back to God. Thus it is essential that, while the message of God is being preached peacefully, the Muslims should also employ other means to remove all obstacles that hinder the establishment of the ideal society.

Discussing the modernist discourse on Jihad, Qutb argues that it is incorrect to confine Jihad to the technical term of a "defensive war". He argues that if we confine it to the modern interpretation of a defensive war, then we are not fulfilling the real objective of Islam. If the real objective of Islam is to be fulfilled then the term "defensive war" has to be interpolated to mean the "defense of man against all those factors and motives that demolish the freedom of man or serve as impediments in his way of real freedom." Further, he argues that any Muslim who understands the purpose of Islam cannot be satisfied by the categorization of Jihad as an offensive war. This categorization would belie the progressive notions of Islam and would imply that Islam is not allowed to challenge the oppressive political systems and the racial and social distinctions of our society. He also notes that holders of these political systems and distinctions will not tolerate the spread of Islam amongst their societies and will fiercely lash out against Islam. Therefore, in any given scenario the Muslims are duty bound to the spread of Islam in the world and have to strive for it both through preaching and movement.

The Western discourse in Jihad can also be divided into two main categories: the confrontationists and the accomodationists.

The confrontationist school is spearheaded by Bernard Lewis. In his book the "Crisis of Islam", Lewis writes that depending on the context Jihad has been interpreted to mean moral striving and armed struggle. The life and experience of the early community of Islam, established by Prophet Mohammed and his companions, provides the model for the spread and defense of jihad and the hijra. Jihad and hijra coupled with the concept of the ummah, which stresses a pan Islamic unity by establishing a worldwide Islamic community, have guided Muslims through out the ages.

According to Lewis, in the chapters of the Quran dating from the Meccan period jihad often refers to moral striving, whereas the chapters dating from the Medinan period (where the Prophet headed the state and commanded the army) the context changes to that of armed struggle. Furthermore, he stresses that for most of the recorded history of Islam the word jihad was used in a military sense. While modern Muslims, particularly when referring to the outside world, explain the duty of Jihad in a moral and spiritual sense, but Lewis declares that the majority of earlier authorities discuss it in the military context. We see a tendency among the confrontationists of the West and Islam to rely on literal interpretations of the Quran and examples of the Prophet, divorcing them from other political, economic and cultural realities. According to Lewis, it is the duty of the House of Islam (Dar-ul-Islam), to continue Jihad until the rest of the World (Dar-ul-Harb or House of War) either adopts Islam or submits to it. He tries to prove this point of view by various quotations from the Quran and Hadiths of the Prophet.

In contemporary times the call for Jihad in Afghanistan was initiated by transnational Islamic religious networks. Ulemas issued fatwas interpreting Soviet intervention as an invasion of the Dar-ul-Islam by the infidels and impious (Kepel, p.139). A defensive Jihad was proclaimed, which according to the Sharia obliges every Muslim to participate. This was further instigated by help from the American and Pakistani governments. Hence jihad began to be seen as the principal force which propagates Muslims towards aggression against the West. As with the Islamic discourse, we notice a divergence of opinion amongst western scholars as well. Not all western scholars believe that violence in the Muslim world has been propagated by religious ideology. As John L. Esposito stresses it would be wrong to interpret Osama bin Laden's ideology by adhering to religious forces alone, as the political climate in Saudi Arabia and the Arab world in the 1960s and 1970s also helped in shaping Laden's extremist worldview. Laden was outraged at the Saudi-American alliance and the presence of American forces in the Kingdom (Esposito, 2002). America was seen by many as a supporter of the corrupt autocratic regimes in Saudi Arabia. Regimes which were commonly viewed as being concerned only with serving their own interests and not paying heed to the demands of the Saudi people at large. Ultimately, the corruption and neglect of the Saudi state was also blamed on America's shoulders, whose support to these regimes hindered the establishment of a more accountable government and a more just society.

According to Esposito, the key influences were the puritanical Wahhabi brand of Islam dominant in Saudi Arabia, the militant jihad ideology of Egypt's Sayyid Qutb, and defeat the Arabs faced in the 1967 Arab Israeli war. The Wahhabi brand of Islam is a strict puritanical faith that emphasizes literal interpretation of the Quran and the example of the Holy Prophet (Esposito, 2002). By awaking memories of the glorious Muslim past, their leaders such as Abdulaziz summoned missionary zeal in the Muslims and directed them to wage jihad against non-Muslims as well as Muslims who do not follow the faith in its purity. Abdullan Azam, Laden's teacher at King Abdulaziz University was an advocate of this form of global militant jihad. Azam was a captivating speaker who preached the message of militant confrontation. Laden was educated at a time when the jihad movements were on the rise in the broader Muslim world and within Saudi Arabia. When the anti-soviet jihad in Afghanistan began Laden joined the Afghan refugee camps in Peshawar, Pakistan. Ironically, this was "good jihad" for America while it felt threatened by Iran's revolutionary movement, which also proclaimed itself to be a form of jihad.

Western accommodationists distinguish between the actions of legitimate Islamist political groups/movements and the extremist minority (Gerges, p.29). Western academia, government and media mostly emphasize actions of the violent groups and movements while downplaying the actions of the more moderate political and non-political movements. Constructing a monolithic Islam leads to religious reductionism (Esposito, 1999) that views political conflicts in the Islamic world as primarily religious conflicts i.e. Islam versus Christianity and Judaism or Islam versus the Western world. They argue that the Islamic movements are basically motivated by the lack of economic opportunities and political freedom. The Islamist movements oppose specific Western policies, which they believe perpetuate Western dominance and the Muslim society's dependence and subservience to it. These policies include the West's support for the corrupt and repressive Middle Eastern regimes, U.S. unconditional support for Israel and the long history of American economic and military intervention in the region.

Furthermore it may be that rise of fundamentalism presents not only challenges but also opportunities and potential for a more reformist and more representative governments. Hence Jihad can also be interpreted as an attempt to help Muslims rise from their dire economic and political conditions.

In 1973 Anwar Sadat raised jihad against Israel, its code name was Badr, symbolizing the first great victory of the Holy Prophet. Emergence of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Iran's Islamic revolution, seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979 by militants who called for the overthrow of the House of Saud, all point to the rise of internal Islamic opposition and reform movements (Esposito, 2002). Esposito explains Laden's ideology in the following words:

In contrast Lewis ignores the fact that people can and do misinterpret and exploit the actual doctrines in order to justify their own ideologies. To him Laden might be considered wrong by other Muslims but his ideology has been driven by Islamic forces and hence he uses it as base to establish a clash of civilizations between Islam and the West. Therefore, according to the confrontationists, the militant ideology of the Muslims and the Islamist movements that it gives birth to, must be contained and stifled at birth.

Esposito claims that although Islam is the second largest religion in the world, many in the West knew nothing about it until Iran's Islamic revolution. Throughout the 1980s, the West's primary experience of Islam was with the Ayatullah Khomeini's brand of radical Islamic fundamentalism. This has obscured the richness of the Shiite religious tradition and spirituality, its diverse branches and differing experiences of attitude towards war and peace. Due to geographic and linguistic factors, inaccessibility of observation of the 'Muslim' individuals, the western observers tend to overemphasize the religious factor.

The Western propensity to see the Arab world through the distorting lens of Islamism (Burgart, p.6) has often been criticized. George Corm argues that the stubborn refusal of Europe to discuss the Muslims of the Middle East, without any reference to geographic, historical or social territoriality is remarkable. They discuss "the world of Islam", "the Muslim people", in a way that entirely disregards history, geography, as well as ethnic roots. There is no distinguishing between Arabs of the Maghreb and the Mashreq, Turks, Iranians and Afghans (Corm, p.378). The Muslims are taken to be one monolithic entity is most popular discourses.

It is interesting to note that when trying to explain the Crusades, Lewis stresses that it has lost its meaning as a Holy war for the Christian world, and is used in a moral sense i.e. a good campaign for a good cause. Whereas, all the subsequent battles between Muslim caliphs of Damascus, Baghdad etc. against the Christian Emperors in Constantinople, Vienna and in more distant countries further west, are explained only under the context of Jihad, ignoring any political, geographical, cultural and moral reasons. Bush referred to the aar against Iraq as the 'Crusades' and later retracted his words. In American foreign policy we can discern a desire to separate religious sentiments from other pressures such as fighting for terrorism, human right violation etc. Bush repeatedly claimed that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were against terrorism and not against Islam or the Muslims. Hence religious forces are conveniently sidestepped when referring to Western policies but are exaggerated when referring to the world of Islam.

As Edward Said argues, although U.S. government and organizations like Human Rights Watch are concerned about bringing Saddam Hussein to trial against humanity, nothing is said against U.S. policy which fully supports Israel's bombing of civilian targets, a crime punishable according to the Fourth Geneva Convention. He questions why is the case that Sharon, Barak, Peres, and all the other leaders whose routine assaults on civilian and human rights constitute the longest-standing and longest-unpunished set of war crimes in history, are never brought to trial or why aren't their actions labeled as religious fanaticism?

In the late twentieth and twenty first centuries the word jihad has been used repeatedly by liberation, resistance and terrorist movements to legitimate their cause and to motivate their followers. Many Muslims believe that the conditions of their world require a jihad. The Muslim world is dominated by corrupt authoritarian governments and wealthy elites. The elite in countries such as Pakistan is a minority concerned solely with its own prosperity. Western governments are perceived as supporting oppressive regimes and exploiting the region's human and natural resources, robbing Muslims of their culture and their options to be governed according to their own choice and to live in a more just society.

Many believe that the restoration of power and prosperity requires creation of more religiously oriented states and societies. A radicalized minority advocate militant jihad in order to liberate Muslims at home and abroad. Islamists will have to realize the fact that they live in a globally interdependent world. And the need to interpret religious ideology in the contemporary world order is essential. Fundamentalists should ask themselves whether the boundaries of Dar-ul-Harb and Dar-ul-Islam are still maintained? The level of corruption, poverty, illiteracy in the Muslim world far surpasses that of the Western world. In such a situation how can the fundamentalists claim to enlighten the rest of the world when their own house is covered with dark clouds?

Further, it should be noted that the fundamentalist interpretation of Jihad, provided by revivalist Muslim scholars are a direct by-product of the turmoil and the crisis of identity suffered by the Muslim world in recent times. In an attempt to understand the predicament of the Muslim world, Muslim thinkers largely came to the conclusion that it is the deviation from the Muslim ways that has led to this plight. In particular, Maududi developed Islamic revivalism in response to fear of Hindu-British domination in the subcontinent and Qutb furthered his brand of Islam revivalism buoyed by the belief that the Muslims were returning to pre-Islamic Jahiliyya, under the influence of western imperialism.

In contemporary times, while invoking the doctrine of Jihad, Osama Bin Laden is pursuing a political agenda, rather than an Islamic one. His rhetoric is mainly based against political issues, i.e. the presence of the American troops in the Arabic Peninsula, American imperialism and American support of the Israeli cause. While the objectives of these terrorists organization do claim the establishment of the ideal Muslim society, yet their actions are divorced from the stated objectives. By targeting their attacks against America and Western world, the Islamist organizations do not help further the message of God to the rest of the world. Rather, they hurt the interests of the Muslim world by providing a skewed version of jihad and Islam to the Western world.

In the contemporary times, the instrument of jihad is expediently employed by Islamist groups to wage their own political agendas. It should also be kept in mind that according to Islamic discourse, jihad is a collective responsibility and can only be declared by a Muslim head of a state, any arbitrary Muslim does not have the authority to declare war in the name of God. Therefore, jihad as it is used in the contemporary times is an aberration of the original concept and has become a mere pseudo-name for the various proxy-wars being waged against the West, in the name of Islam.

It is recommended that in order to achieve a more tolerant world order it is important to investigate why extremist groups have stuck to the militant version of Jihad, leading in some cases to the legitimization of terrorism. Fighting violence with violence will not help solve the problems faced in the contemporary world. It is evident that America's war on Afghanistan and Iraq did not help diminish the extremist movements, but rather helped aggravate anti-American feelings around the globe? The need is for the world to view these problems in an unbiased way and make an attempt to understand the factors that nurture Osama Bin Ladens in our world. It is recommended that the 'greater' Jihad be waged in the Muslim world in the form of reform movements that attempt to diagnose the problems rather than cure the symptoms.

The Central Asian States (CAS) and the Caucasus are resource-rich, yet impoverished and autocratic states. It is an established fact that the Caspian reserves are one of the largest in the world. According to the 1999 International Energy Statistics Sourcebook, the proven oil reserves stand at 78.2 billion barrels and proven gas reserves are 237.3 billion barrels (Alam). But other observers like Bremmer contend that the proven oil reserves stand at 200 billion barrels and proven gas reserves stand at 200-350 billion barrels. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have the largest reservoirs of oil and gas in the region,closely followed by Turkmenistan. Oil consumption all over the world has increased, but the United States has been particularly affected,consequently the area holds greater significance for American policy makers.

American interest in the CAS and the Caucasus is two-fold. On the one hand, the United States wants to integrate the region into the Western world order (i.e. prevent Russia from re-establishing hegemonic control over the region) and on the other hand use the resources from the region to provide for its energy needs. The main objective of the US in the CAS and the Caucasus is to prevent Russia from re-entrenching itself in the region. After the break-up in 1991, USSR lost the effective control is used to enjoy over the region and United States saw it as an opportunity to export the Western world order to the newly independent states.

Over time a definite American policy evolved and in 1997, Under-Secretary of State Strobe Talbott "outlined four dimensions of US support to the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia: 1) The promotion of democracy; 2) The creation of free market economies; 3) The sponsorship of peace and cooperation within and among the countries of the region; and 4)integration into the larger community." (MacDougall) It is evident from these objectives that the aim was to wrestle the countries away from autocratic governance and centralized economies. It is interesting to note here that if the US is able to provide the CAS and the Caucasus with alternative oil transit routes, it would be successful in breaking the Russian monopoly over the region. Moscow has cultural and historical bonds with the CAS and the Caucasus but one of the main leverages it holds against these states, is its exclusive control over the pipeline infrastructure. The oil-producing countries are thus made dependent on the Russia for transport of their oil. In another speech in 1997 Talbot emphatically highlighted the strategic value of the region for the US. "If economic and political reform… does not succeed, if internal and cross-border conflicts simmer and flare, the region could become a breeding ground of terrorism and political extremism, and a battleground for outright war. It would matter profoundly to the United States if that were to happen in an area that sits on as much as 200 billion barrels of oil." (Blank)

The second objective of the Americans in the region is was to gain access to the untapped oil and gas reserves of the region. "On an average the Americans consume 19.7 million barrels of oil per day (mbd). The USA produces 9.1 mbd i.e. 47% of its demand. The US imports 11.1 mbd – equal to about 59% of total US oil consumption." (Kumar) The US Energy Department projects that by the year 2020 the United States would need to import nearly two-thirds of its energy requirements.

The incidents of 9/11 have strengthened the American resolve to reduce its dependence on OPEC for its oil supplies. Saudi Arabia has long being the main supplier of oil for the US. Kumar argues that "the American policy makers used to feel that the United States possessed a valuable political lever over Saudi Arabia's conduct. But over time this notion is changing and is now becoming more apparent in Saudi Arabian view that the United States isn't involved in the Middle East to defend Saudi Arabia, but rather to defend oil." This change in attitude has caused a shift in the Saudi attitude and thus the American policy makers feel that their interests in OPEC can no longer be looked after by the Saudi elite. "In other words it is important that the US establishes strategic presence in other regions so as to prevent an oil crisis caused by a shift in OPEC– US relations caused by anti – US sentiments. Hence the search fornew suppliers like the Caucasus and Central Asia in and around the Caspian Sea basin." (Kumar) Along with providing the US with greater freedom of choice while importing oil, the diversification of oil suppliers would also help keep the oil prices down. (Arvanitopoulos)

It is evident from this discussion that vital American interests would be served if it is able to entrench itself in the region. In order to establish its strategic influence in the region, the US looks to establish pipelines in the region, which are under its strategic control. In addition the Americans would want to make its presence felt in the region by seeking out allies. In particular the United States has sought the support of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Turkey is United States' strategic partner in this new game of 'pipeline politics' while Azerbaijan and Turkey are the new 'oil states' for the US. At the same time, Russia would be keen to buttress its network of pipelines in the region and would aim to minimize American influence in the region. Bremmer notes that "a pipeline provides investment and jobs, long-term access to natural resources and transit fees, and-most important-political and economic leverage. In a region where all these things are in critically short supply, pipeline politics matter." The United States wants to "exclude Iran from influencing the exploration, shipment, development and marketing of energy products" (Blank), while promoting Turkey as an ideal outlet of foreign trade out of the region.

Although, the CAS and the Caucasus can easily provide for the energy needs of the world, but face problems concerning the transportation of the energy resources to the rest of the world. Enumerated below are the factors that contribute to the problem of transportation:

One striking feature about Central Asia and the Caucasus is that all the oil producing countries of the region are landlocked. This means that they have to rely on other external actors to gain access to the water-ways and to set up possible transit routes. Thus foreign investors and the governments of these countries are involved in a perpetual struggle for developing favorable transit routes out of theregion. Therefore, the issue of pipeline selection is of greatest geopolitical significance for the region. It is easy to observe that whichever power or 'centre of power' is able to establish its monopoly over the pipeline routes will have the greatest geopolitical and economic leverage in the region.

The Russian factor is also very important and warrants some discussion. As a legacy of its century-old rule over the region, Russia has a monopoly over the oil transit routes out of the region. Majority of the existing pipelines passing through Russian territory and thus make the oil-producing states dependent on Russia for access to markets around the globe. "The existing pipeline routes for oil from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan (run) through Russia to the port of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea, giving Moscow a considerable advantage in the process of pipeline selection." (Arvanitopoulos) This has allowed the Russians to influence deals made between the oil producing states and the foreign oil companies. Moscow uses the pipelines as a leverage to exhort favorable terms of agreement and as tools to maintain its influence over the oil producing states. The mere fact that export of oil is one of the primary sources of capital for these states has made them especially vulnerable to Russian manipulation. Consequentially all the oil-producing states are eagerly searching for alternative partners so that they can reduce the Russian influence over their politico-economic life.

The CAS and the Caucasus possess little capital and technology to develop their vast oil and gas reserves. This present an ideal opportunity for investment and development to foreign investors, like Chevron. Arvanitopoulos alludes to this very fact by pointing out that the American establishment also aims to create economic opportunities for American companies. Bremmer points out that the pipelines that are currently in place are used to transport "early oil, i.e. the primitive and the relatively low-level Caspian production". The pipelines used for this purpose are Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline, Baku-Supsa one that travels from Kazakhstan to Russia. It is further noted that all three can only carry from 100,000 to 160,000 barrels a day.

These pipeline arrangements are thus temporary in nature and cannot cater to a) the growing demand for Caspian oil and b) to the changing geopolitical realities of the region and to complex strategic needs of external powers like the United States. It is therefore necessary to look at the pipeline options that are available to the players of this "New Great Game":

1.The Northern Route: The Northern Route calls for the expansion of the Kazakhstan-Russia pipeline so that it can be linked with the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline. This option is highly favored by the Russian as it helps them maintain their monopoly over the region, while acting as a good source of revenue. But, as Kumar catalogues this route faces major opposition by the United States and Turkey. The United States wants to prevent the Russians from strengthening its strategic hold on the region while Turkey has environmental concerns over the increased traffic that would result in the Bosphorus/Turkish Straits. Another major problem faced by this route is that it would have to pass through the turbulent and war-torn area of Chechnya.

2.The Western Route The Western Route calls for the construction of a Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. This pipeline would emerge in the Baku and will transport oil to the Turkish port of Ceyhan via Tbilisi. This route is the largely favored by the United States, Turkey and Georgia. The Southern Route: The Southern Route will go through Iran and calls for the expansion of the Turkmenistan-Iran pipeline. This is the most cost-effective route, as it can effectively link the CAS and the Caucasus to the rest of the world, but is strongly opposed by the United States.

3.The Eastern Route: The Eastern Route links China's Xinjaing province with CAS and the Caucasus. This pipeline would transport oil from the Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to China, where it could be further distributed to Japan and India. This is a highly ambitious pipeline route as the proposed pipeline would be more than 2000 km, but the Chinese government considers it a strategic interest and is thus willing to go through with it.

4.The South-Eastern Route The South-Eastern Route caters to the expanding Asian market, by linking Turkmenistan to Pakistan and India through Afghanistan. During the mid-90's substantial attempts were made by the CentGas consortium to set up a pipeline but they failed to deliver due to continued political instability of the region.

I have already addressed American interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus, now I shall look at the policy decisions and steps that the United States government has taken to achieve these interests in the region:

The main American interest in the region was to prevent Russia from monopolizing the local energy supply and from establish its sphere of influence in the region. The US has had a very ambivalent policy in this regards. On the one hand, US insists that its policy aims do not attempt to divide Central Asia and the Caucasus into rival spheres of the influence and only look to establish a "win-win" strategic order in the region for all (Blank). But the ground realities of American policies in the region reflect otherwise. In order to reduce Russian influence in the region, America has adopted a two-pronged policy. On the one hand, the US has tried to export democratic ideals to these states and has tried to inculcate liberal norms into these societies.

On the other hand, the US has been providing economic aid, specifically, to oil-producing states like Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (Hill). As we have seen throughout the course, majority of the Central Asian States and the Caucasus still have the old Communist elite in power. The resultant nature of these governments is autocratic and restrictive. Popular democracy has not been allowed to flourish and free market dynamics have failed to develop, in short theses states are still following Soviet era political orders. Nevertheless, at the same time the ruling elites of all the states are looking to escape from the Russian yoke. Therefore, it would be safe to say that with the inculcation of liberal norms these states, would move to a different ideological wavelength than the Russians and thus would find it easier to escape the Russian model.

Similarly, the economic aid is provided as an incentive to these states so to encourage them to adopt pro-US policies. American attempts to democratize and liberalize Central Asia and the Caucasus have borne little or no fruit. This failure is a consequence of skewed implementation of these ideals. Although the US has continuously espoused democratic and liberal ideals for the region, but their actions on the ground reflect that they are mere rhetoric. Hill observes that as a result of increased congressional funding to the security agenda, the U.S. military has taken the lead with the U.S. Central Command spearheading joint exercises, language instruction, and training programs for Central Asian forces in peacekeeping and counter-terrorism. The US agenda therefore has focused on combating terrorism and security issues and have thus tempered with initiatives that promote democratization in the region. "Flawed elections and human rights abuses have been met by lukewarm reprimands from top U.S. officials rather than meaningful penalties on regional governments. This has been backed by diversion of funds from programs promoting democracy and liberal values to programs aimed at bolstering the security of the region."(Hill) Blank notes that oil producing states like Uzbekistan that have repressive governments and closed economies get far greater aid than progressive states yet non-supplier states like Kyrgyzstan. Policies like these only strengthen the authoritarian regimes of the regime and the take the region further away from ideals of democracy. As we have observed through out the course, Central Asian states are transitional states and the conditions are rife for social upheaval. By blindly supporting the authoritarian regimes in the region, America is helping increase the instability in the region and is fueling the anti-status quo forces.

The US has also worked hard to ensure that Iran is unable to establish its hegemony and control in the region. Alam notes "the Southern routes make sense economically and commercially since they are the shortest, quickest and cheapest routes and would pass through relatively safer territories and pose no serious environmental hazard." Yet due to the history of the US-Iran relations, America has staunchly opposed any development along the Iranian/Southern route. In particular the Iran Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) was passed by the US Congress in the 1995, which imposed major penalties on the main international investors in Iran's oil and gas industry. It restricted companies from investing more than $20 billion in Iran and $40 billion in Libya. The motive behind the US sanctions against Iran was to contain and isolate Iran and cripple its economy so that it could not emerge as a formidable power that could challenge the US interests in the region and elsewhere. (Alam)

American policy towards Iran in the Caspian has driven by politics rather than economics. I feel that this is not a pragmatic approach. I say this because Iran itself has adopted a very pragmatic approach in the region and is aware of the real dynamics of the region. They have looked to maximize their advantage and have cashed in on their strategic location, which makes them a launching pad for transport of oil around the globe. Faliure of American policies in this regard can be gauged by the fact that despite active US opposition, Kazakhstan is considering to "engage in oil swaps with Iran." I believe other states in the region will also engage in deals with Iran, if they perceive profitable returns out of them. It should also be noted that the cold shoulder America provides to Iran, only strengthens the Russian-Iranian nexus in the region. The strengthening of this relationship is against United States' vital interests. Alam also highlights the fact American oil-companies are interested in investing in Iran despite considerable official opposition. American foreign policy thus is depriving "US companies from attainting future economic and benefits." Therefore, it would be pragmatic and beneficial to American interests if the US reconsiders its Iranian policy in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

The main aim of US foreign policy in Central Asia and the Caucasus has been to establish US-backed pipelines in the region. In February 1995, the United States decided to support pipelines running through Turkey and not Russia. Since then America has supported all plans for Western pipelines through the region. All Western routes originate in Baku, Azerbaijan and terminate in the Black Sea. The US has supported three pipelines in the region: the Baku-Supsa pipeline, the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) route is favored by the US as its Main Export Pipeline (MEP) and will materialize the American vision of an East-West Corridor that opens up Central Asia to the West, while restricting the role Russia and Iran can play in the region. (Alam)

The US is also attempting to involve Kazakhstan in the BTC route, by connecting Baku to Aqtau, Kazakhstan. This will further strengthen American strategic presence in the region. America's Main Export Pipeline is riddled with many problems. Foremost, amongst them are the local conflicts festering in Azerbaijan and Georgia- the two transit states of the BTC. Conflicts are rife in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, where the inhabitants are seeking independence from Georgia. Azerbaijan is also facing major problems in the Armenian populated enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. "Nagorno-Karabakh has maintained a de-facto independence for eight years" (Alam) and the problem is "further exacerbated by the oil factor has seriously affected the oil export route." (Alam) Further complicating the prospects for BTC, is the fact that the BTC will have to established in area where no previous infrastructure exists and initial estimates yo establish the 1750 km pipeline reach $2.5 billion dollars. As a result, the oil companies are hesitant to invest in the region as yet. The BTC pipeline is further debilitated by the relatively small-scale volume of oil extracted from Azerbaijan. Presently the Azeri oil production is about 200,000 barrels per day, while the proposed Ceyhan terminal is built to cater to 300,000-ton tanker per day. (Stuart). This has resulted in the American efforts to persuade Kazakhstan to connect with the BTC through Aqtau and provide the difference.

The Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline also faces similar problems. The proposed pipeline will have to pass through the independent-minded and war-torn Chechnya. Russia has been fighting Muslim insurgents in the Chechnya for a long time and has been unable to resolve the conflict and the Chechen conflict has over flown to other areas in the region. Critical amongst those areas is Dagestan which borders Chechnya and is equally rife with internal conflict and turmoil (Alam). Foreign companies have thus found it difficult to being work on these two main pipelines of the region. The American foreign policy establishment should consider the current stalemate on these pipelines and should re-evaluate its options. One viable option would be recommencing the South-Eastern pipeline project through Afghanistan, as political normalization and stability is beginning to take place. This is also an imperative for the American establishment to reconsider its policy towards Iran.

In 1995 US foreign policy intelligentsia decided to take active interest in Central Asia and the Caucasus and it was reported then that "the new approach, coordinated by the National Security Council is designed to break Russia's grip on Central Asia's oil export. The objective is both to help ensure the survival of independent states in the region and to protect US cooperate interests." (Blank) Given this imperative, the US took on the role of an arbiter in the region. Blank documents several incidents where the US intervened in local conflicts and stalemates to resolve problems arising between third parties. The United States intervened in a conflict between Turkmenistan and Ukraine, by urging Turkmenistan to send gas to Ukraine, even though Ukraine had failed to pay for it. The United States also acted as an arbiter between the competing factions of Azeris and Turkmen. The motivation for taking on the role of an arbiter is the desire to keep the region as a "zone of free competition" and so that the US is able to "deny either Iran or Russian any lasting hegemony". "These (initiatives) include the Minsk process to negotiate a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the opening of the 'new Silk Road' and/or East-West trade corridor, in addition to US involvement with oil and gas pipelines." (Blank)

Lastly, the United States has made substantial efforts to establish its military presence in the region. Blanks documents that the US wanted to develop a coherent security policy for the CAS and the Caucasus and thus the Pentagon allocated areas of responsibility to US commands for the Caspian region. By announcing its military presence in the region, the US wants to tie the region to the West through PfP (NATO's 'Partnership for Peace' Program), enhance the local capabilities for self-defense and prevent a military reliance on Russia. The announcement of America's military might in the region is also intended to deprive Russia from its traditional role as a mediator in conflict resolution. Since 9/11, the US has renewed its efforts to undertake defense reform in the region. A Brookings Institute report identifies the American desire to help the Central Asian states acquire "modern up-to-date communications equipment" and "essential military equipment" and help the Central Asian states improve their border security. All these efforts are being made to prevent de-stabilization of the region at the hands of Islamist and radical militants groups. The events of 9/11 have also allowed United States to place its special forces in Azerbaijan. The official purpose of these forces is to help prepare the Azerbaijan forces against possible militant activities. The US Special Forces are also to establish an American base in Azerbaijan and overlook the security of the BTC pipeline. This placement of strategic forces in Central Asia has allowed the US to have concrete military presence in the region and allows it to directly offset Russia's military presence in the region. One problem that I perceive with this policy is that it threatens Russia with concrete American presence in the region. This can fuel a Russian security dilemma and instead of making the region more stable and secure, it will introduce greater instability and polarization in the region.

In conclusion, American foreign policy in the region is primarily driven by the quest for new oil resources and a resolve to establish its strategic hold in the region. American policies thus adopted aim to maximize these objectives, but at times fail to address critical aspects regional politics, thereby adding to the political instability of the region.