What have been the reasons that have led to the recent popularity of the MMA that has translated in their success in the elections? My main contention in this paper is that it has really not been the MMA’s ability to connect with the masses but rather the failure of the secular mainstream parties to do so which has been the deciding factor.

’Ideology refers to a set of ideas and beliefs which makes clear what is valued and what is not, what must be maintained and what must be changed, and what shapes the attitudes of those that share it’[Jackson & Jackson]

The defining characteristic of a political party has much to do with its ideology which puts it closer to the voters who share a similar vision of progress, change and ideological position. The much needed ideology which is so pivotal to politics and a political party was missing within the wings of both secular parties.

’In the 2002 elections, they failed to take a stand on issues like Musharraf’s controversial referendum, US attack on Afghanistan, Legal Framework Order (LFO), restoration of democracy and one-man-one-post policy. Such lack of character undermined their credentials and strengthened the locus standi of the mullahs’ [Misra, 2005].

Another important factor in party politics and one that promotes progressive change is the role of internal elections within political parties. This is necessary in training of new leadership within the party ranks and ensures that a political vacuum isn’t created if the old leadership gets eliminated.

’In the case of Pakistan, of the major parties in the country, only the right wing, fundamentalist Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) has been able to conduct regular, internal elections. Within most of the other political parties, leadership has remained limited to a particular group, sometimes based on kinship networks, articulating only a narrow range of interests. Internal power struggles in the absence of party elections have led frequently to the fragmentation of political parties into factions or splinter groups, and this process has contributed in part to the steadily increasing number of political groupings present in the country.’[Human Rights Commission Of Pakistan - Electoral Watch]

This has resulted in the failing of the secular parties to effectively train its leadership to changing trends and demands within the political scenario. Furthermore, since the top heads of the two parties (PPP and PML) have never changed this has effectively led to the deceleration of the growth of democracy within the country since political parties have been unable to include more people within the political culture.

The main characteristics and functions of ’strong’ political parties (the features which ’weak’ undemocratic, elite-based political parties lack), are described by David Apter - that first of all, they organize as well as transmit public opinion and attitudes to the government; they take into account the entire socio-political framework of the society in which they function and draw their support from. Thus, political parties not only perform an important role in linking the needs and demands of the people to the policy making people within the state, they also need to provide transparency and accountability in a way that they have to maintain a respectable record of citizen responsiveness in order to get re-elected for another tenure. [Udofio, pg 436]. Responding to a question as to the reasons for MMA’s success, Pervez Hoodbhoy responded:

’The manifestos of the secular parties stopped at shallow rhetoric that nobody really believed. These parties said little that made any sense about how to approach Pakistan’s gigantic problems - the constant threat of war with India, a parasitic military establishment that has emaciated the country, growing poverty and mal-distribution of wealth, an education system that collapsed long ago, shrinking water supplies, environmental degradation and much more’ [Newsline,2005].

Failure for the political parties has not only been in their inability to meet the needs of the masses but also their involvement in misappropriation of resources and moral turpitude. Over the years, the disenchantment of the public with political parties, especially with PPPP and PML-N, increased because of widespread corruption, embezzlement, nepotism, and mis-governance [Misra, 2005].

The concept of the role political parties not only in government but also out of government as opposition parties to keep a check on the parties in power by educating and transmitting public opinion and acting like a ’loyal opposition’ [Harrison, pg 392, Udofio, pg 442, Jackson & Jackson] has failed to materialize in Pakistan and successive governments in power have had charges of corruption leveled against them by the same ’worthy opposition’. In 1990 and 1996, corruption and mismanagement were cited among the reasons for the Benazir government’s removal. This politics of ’mud slinging’ has only helped destabilize governments in power and brought opposition into the governments.

However, blaming just the mainstream parties of under-performance is missing a certain essence since Pakistan’s political failures cannot be understood fully without acknowledging the role of the establishment in preventing the emergence of genuinely popular and well-organized political parties [SA Tribune, 2005]. Thus a pertinent question which I shall address now is as to what role if any did the military establishment play in influencing the outcome of the October elections, and if it did, what was it to gain?

It would be naive to suggest that Pakistan which has had its share of both military as well as civilian governments with the former dominating the political scenario (for 31 years) [11, NLR], has had a change of heart and is really oriented towards democratic change. Akbar Zaidi contends that the elections of 2002 have been a sort of order continuing in the country where the supremacy of the army has always been dominant over the civilian public [Zaidi, 175].

The controversy all began when the military government in order to support a civilian facade decided of re-creating a political party which would be ’pro-Musharraf’.

’Like an out-of-work courtesan, the Muslim League - the country’s foundational party - was given a shower, dusted with powder and provided with a new wig, before being displayed to the growing queue of potential suitors’[Ali]

Thus from the defected ranks of the People’s Party and the Muslim League, the PML (QA) was born. This sadly also represents the degree of opportunism within the mainstream political parties of supporting the ousting of the elected incumbent government so that they can have a chance to form their own government. However ’Lota-ism’ is not a new phenomenon.

The government after creating a ’King’s Party’ further announced the requirement of a Bachelor’s degree as a pre-requisite, creating yet another hurdle barring nearly 95-96% of the MNAs and MPAs from contesting elections. Even the Supreme Court upheld the decision siding with the establishment, showing its institutional integrity.

The voting process itself was rigged as the establishment tried to tamper with ’democratic forces’ to steer election to their choice of candidate. The EU evaluation committee (ECP) found misuse of state resources in favor of political parties, in particular, but not exclusively, for the PML (QA). The government’s late lift on the ban on political parties’ activities a few days before polling day, and the debarring of major political parties’ heads from contesting elections, resulted in delays which effectively reduced the campaign period to a mere twenty-three days. Public authorities and also the local administration (Nazims) up to senior levels of governance were actively involved in partisan electioneering which appeared to be a pattern throughout the country. On a number of occasions, state officials and Nazims made public statements in support of certain candidates or against other candidates.[Europa, 2005] However the PML (QA) still couldn’t gain a majority and hence had to form coalition with other political parties. The MMA emerged as a winner in NWFP and forged an alliance in Baluchistan. [Misra, 2005]

Although most governments that came into power remained covertly secular, time and again the religious nature of the state had to be re-affirmed and those that remained in power tried to expand on their Islamic credentials as a means to acquire legitimacy. We see this throughout history with Bhutto’s declaration of Ahmedis as non-Muslims, Zia’s Islamization in the 80’s and the Shariat Bill by Nawaz Sharif. [Gaborieau, pg 44-46] However surprisingly, Musharraf portrayed himself as a moderate and secular Muslim and vowed to rid Pakistan of extremist elements [Asdar Ali]. This may in fact have been attributable to the increased pressure that Pakistan has had from the US to crack down on terrorist and jehadist camps and reform of madarassas [Misra, 2005]. So in lieu of the changed objectives of the US as a ’benevolent leader’ [Akhtar, pg 5] Musharraf is now promoting the secular ideology.

With the victory of the MMA, an alliance of ’Islamic hardliners’ as viewed by the US, is wary of the consequences if power was ever to fall into the hands of these Islamists. Zaidi is of the view that Musharraf stands to benefit from this victory of the MMA, as he will be in a better position to negotiate with the US. He will be able to use this as a way of legitimizing and furthering his own rule by arguing that Pakistan will be in dangerous hands if left up to these ’fundamental’ groups. [ibid, 5] Ahmed Rashid, an eminent Pakistani journalist while writing for the Wall Street Journal commented that it appeared that the army and the ISI sponsored the religious leaders, or Mullahs, to ensure that the West does not question the need for continued military rule to contain the religious parties. [Daily Excelsior, 2005] With the changed perception of the West particularly the US after 9/11, it has sought to curb the growth of ’Islamic militancy’ in order to create a world based on ’peace’. Given the old role of ’Pakistan as a safe haven for terrorists’ and with a religious party in power, the Bush-Mush alliance was easily mandated within the Senate. This indicates that the elections might have been engineered to actually ’let the MMA win’ since Musharraf had much to gain from this outcome.

The MMA’s performance post election period has cast further doubts amongst the opposition and other observers. Initially the criticism that MMA members made of the military regime and the stand on the Legal Framework Order (LFO) made many believe that the MMA’s success lies in its willingness to challenge the military and the US. But recent developments whereby it is quite clear that the MMA is going to make a deal with the government on LFO prove that the MMA was never truly against the military intervention. It was just waiting to be offered the right incentives to join the ruling coalition. If the religious parties that together form the MMA had actually started believing in democracy against military rule then they could not have contemplated a settlement over LFO. This is the case right now and will remain so till General Musharraf is in power. All the criticism that MMA leaders made of military government in the past year becomes meaningless now; they will just become another PML(Q), a party which works to strengthen military in the country’s politics [Jang Group, 2005]. Furthermore, the recent developments mark that the Parliament has accepted to keep Musharraf in power. This only goes on to further the fact that there has effectively been an MMA alliance -- not Muttahida Majlis-e-Ammal, but rather a Mullah-Military-Alliance in which the religious parties have been co-opted, thus marring the politics of the country. Furthermore, the Supreme Court (SC) has given the military president a free hand to thwart the constitution and change it as he wishes. This speaks of the sad state of affairs in Pakistan.

Recommendations:

Some of the outcomes that have emerged from this paper are weak political parties, an authoritarian military establishment which seeks to entrench itself playing upon the opportunist elements in society and weak institutions. Because political parties were ’weak’ in the sense that they exerted no real mass popular support of the masses, they served only their own vested interests, and failed to keep themselves accountable to the public, which gave the military the power to intervene as a savior of the nation. Every time this has happened, the military has grown stronger and with the situation prevailing right now it is very evident that the military has, and will, go to large extents to retain its power and longevity within the Pakistani state. However the military is not the answer or a viable alternative to weak political parties and systems because as seen throughout history, the military in Pakistan has stunted the emergence of democratic political processes and parties in order to make its role in politics self-sustaining.

The problems of education, health, poverty, and injustice that affect the Pakistani public are rooted in the bigger governance problems. The military has used different tactics to legitimize itself and has been welcomed by the bureaucracy and self serving politicians.

The civil-military elite is the pre-eminent capital-owning class and has due to its advantageous position (both in terms of power and money), penetrated most of the institutions in Pakistan. It has used this position to its advantage, to further its interests, which have been detrimental to the country. As long as the military keeps intervening and controlling the state institutions, public institutions like the parliament and the judiciary will never develop. Without developing and strengthening these institutions it is very difficult to develop a just and equitable society

Bibliography

• Akhtar, Asim Sajjad, ’The classic frontline state’ in Mohmand, Shandana, K(ed.) Development in Pakistan, Lahore.
• Ali, Tariq, ’The Color Khaki’ 8 Feb. 2004.
• Asdar Ali, Kamran, ’Islam, Politics and Change’ in Mohmand, Shandana, K(ed.) Development in Pakistan, Lahore, p.1.
• Daily Excelsior, ’Rise of MMA to Power’’, Khan, Abdul Wadood Khan.
• Europa, ’European Union’s Election Observation Mission to Pakistan 2002’, 10 Feb 2005.
• Gaborieau, Marc, ’Religion in the Pakistani Polity’ in Mohmand, Shandana, K. (ed.), Development in Pakistan, Lahore, pp. 44-46.
• Harrison, Paul, 1993, ’Chapter 20: Something is Rotten in the State - the Politics of Poverty’, Inside the Third World, p. 392.
• Human Rights Commission of Pakistan -Electoral Watch, Political Parties in Pakistan, Feb 2005.
• Jackson & Jackson, ’Modern Ideologies and Philosophies’ in Rais, Rasul Baksh (ed.) Introduction to Politics p. 151.
• Jackson & Jackson, ’Political Parties and Interests Groups’ in Rais, Rasul Baksh (ed.) Introduction to Politics.
• Jang Group, ’MMA and LFO ’, Bano Masooda.
• Misra, Ashutosh, ’Rise of Religious Parties in Pakistan: Causes and Prospects’, 1 Feb 2005.
• Newsline, ’When The Mullahs Come Marching In’, Shimaila Matri, 6 Feb 2005.
• South Asian Tribune, ’How the Army Subverted Pakistan’s Political System, Again and Again’, 2 Feb 2005.
• Udofio, O. E, 1981, Nigerian Political Parties: Their Role in Modernizing the Political System, 1920 -1966, Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 11 No. 4, p.435.
• Zaidi, Akbar, S., ’Continuity Rather than Change: Elections 2002’ in Mohmand, Shandana, K. (ed.), Development in Pakistan, Lahore, pp 175-179.